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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 970112 
(Category No. 2) 
FORREST WHITTLE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The following Brief is written in reply to that filed by the State on January 19, 
1999. To avoid confusion, Defendant will maintain the same organization as in his 
original Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts of the State is written "in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict." (State Brief, p. 4). Defendant does not object to this approach since he 
has agreed in his opening Brief that when viewed as a whole there was sufficient 
evidence to convict him by the trial jury. (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 6). The question 
in this appeal, however, is not whether the evidence is sufficient for conviction but 
whether the claimed trial errors by Defendant could have resulted in a different result by 
the trial jury in light of the bleak and highly conflicting evidence presented. For this 
reason, therefore, Defendant maintains that his Statement of Facts outlining both sides is 
the more appropriate summation in light of the issues in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR DURING 
THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDING VIOLATED 
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO FUNDAMENTAL 
FAIRNESS AND WAS FLAGRANT MISCONDUCT 
WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY INFRINGED ON THE 
GRAND JURY'S ABILITY TO EXERCISE 
INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT. 
The State argues that this Court is precluded from applying state constitutional law 
in this matter because the issue is not separately briefed. (State Brief at 13, fh. 7). This 
argument is totally incorrect. Defendant has cited in his Opening Brief both Article I 
Section 13 and Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. The Utah language 
essentially mirrors that of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Since 
there have been no Utah cases interpreting the Utah Constitution as to the grand jury 
issues of this appeal, it is entirely appropriate to cite federal and other state cases for 
guidance. In fact, Defendant has relied upon historical, policy arguments, and parallel 
federal law to assist this Court "in arriving at a proper interpretation of the provision in 
question." Society of Separtionists v. Whitehead, as cited in Brief of Appellee, id. 
Likewise, citation by Defendant to the American Bar Association standards for 
prosecutors is also intended to assist this Court in formulating any state constitutional 
standard. (Appellant's Brief at 30). For these reasons, therefore, this Court may apply 
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both a federal and state constitutional test to the arguments advanced by Appellant in this 
case. 
The State has taken the position that once a defendant has been indicted by a grand 
jury and convicted by a trial jury that no appellate review of the grand jury proceedings— 
no matter how flagrantly improper—can occur. (State Brief at 14-21). It is the State's 
contention, therefore, that a finding of guilty by the trial jury cleanses any governmental 
wrongful conduct during the grand jury proceeding. Such an argument is untenable and 
should not be adopted by this Court in interpreting Utah's Constitution. Moreover, this 
all or nothing standard proposed by the State is rejected by a majority of state and federal 
courts which allow a limited standard of review of government misconduct in grand jury 
proceedings. 
The State cites Utah law, other state law, and federal law in support of its position 
that any error in the grand jury proceeding is cured by the petit jury's verdict of guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. (State Brief at 14-21). Defendant will now analyze this 
proposed extreme standard for forgiving grand jury misconduct. 
Utah Law. The State suggests that this Court has already decided that grand jury 
proceedings cannot be reviewed by any court. (State Brief at 14). The State v. Giles 
decision relied upon by the government, however, does not involve a Utah grand jury at 
all but instead focused upon whether a city judge could be held in contempt by a district 
judge for failing to conduct a second preliminary hearing. Even its dicta relating to 
review of an information has been modified by this Court's decision in State v. 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991). In Humphrey this Court held that a district court 
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has inherent authority to determine whether its original jurisdiction has been properly 
invoked and may therefore independently examine the preliminary proceeding and review 
the evidentiary record of the magistrate. Id. at 466. 
The State relies upon Humphrey and the Court of Appeals decision of State v. 
Quash, 837 P.2d 565 (Utah App. 1992) as authority that Defendant's subsequent 
conviction by the petit jury mooted his challenge to the grand jury proceeding. (State 
Brief at 14-16). For several reasons this argument must fail. 
First, these cases do no control the present issue concerning grand jury 
proceedings. Since the State made this same argument in its Motion Opposing the 
Supplementing of the Record on Appeal with the grand jury transcript, it is assumed that 
this Court would have granted the State's motion if these cases had already established 
the rule argued by the state. A panel of this Court, however, in its February 19, 1998 
order stated, "The Court expresses no view on the merits of the appellant's contention 
that he can challenge an aspect of the grand jury proceeding after he has been convicted 
after trial." 
Second, Humphrey, Quash, and State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1995) 
all involve challenges to the sufficiency of evidence during the magistrate hearings. The 
instant case involves allegations of improper prosecutional conduct during the grand jury 
proceeding. 
Finally, while the State maintains that "an indictment is equivalent in all material 
respects to a bind-over" (State Brief at 16) such is not the case. A bind-over hearing 
involves an adversarial proceeding in which the defendant and his attorney are present, 
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where cross examination of the state's witnesses can occur, where defense witnesses can 
be called, and where an independent magistrate presides over the entire proceeding. 
Contrast this to the grand jury proceeding where neither the defendant nor his attorney is 
present, no witness is subject to cross examination, no defense witness is permitted to 
testify, and all proceedings are conducted by the prosecutor. Defendant maintains that 
appellate protection needed from abuse in a preliminary hearing proceeding before a 
magistrate is considerably less than that required in a secret grand jury proceeding. 
Other States. Defendant acknowledges that a few states have adopted the grand 
jury review standard now proposed by the State. (State Brief at 16). However, many 
other states have created a limited review standard for those cases involving prosecutorial 
misconduct rather than deficiency of evidence or technical violations. These cases rely 
on both federal and state law in reviewing grand jury proceedings.1 
JSee Hum v. State, 872 P.2d 189 (Ala. Ska. App. 1994) (defendant must show that 
violation prejudiced fairness of grand jury proceeding); People v. Bergen, 883 P.2d 532 
(Colo. App. 1994) (prosecutorial misconduct during grand jury proceeding can result in 
dismissal of indictment if actual prejudice accrues to defendant or misconduct 
compromises structural integrity of grand jury proceeding to such a degree as to allow for 
presumption of prejudice); State v. Jones, 873 P.2d 122 (Ida. 1994) (court must dismiss 
indictment if, despite adequate finding of probable cause, prosecutorial misconduct in 
submitting illegal evidence was so egregious as to be prejudicial); People v. Torres, 613 
N.E.2d 338 (111. App. 1993) (prosecutorial misconduct may warrant dismissal of 
indictment where defendant's due process rights are violated such that right to a fair trial 
is prejudiced or where prosecutor's conduct in some way undermines integrity of judicial 
process as manifested in grand jury proceeding); Commonwealth v. Drumgold, 668 
N.E.2d 300 (Mass. 1996) (dismissal of indictment is warranted if prosecutors do not 
disclose exculpatory evidence which would greatly undermine credibility of evidence 
likely to affect grand jury's decision to indict, thus resulting in impairment of the grand 
jury proceeding); State v. Mollicone, 654 A.2d 311 (R.I. 1995) (irregularities resulting in 
prejudice to defendant or to the grand jury process constitute extraordinaiy circumstances 
to support dismissal of indictment). 
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U.S. Supreme Court Decisions. The government relies heavily upon United States 
v. Mechanik in its argument that any error in the grand juiy proceeding was cured by the 
petit jury's verdict of guilty. (State Brief at 14-18). This reliance is misplaced. 
In Mechanik the trial of defendants had commenced for over two weeks before 
defense attorneys realized that two law enforcement agents testified together before the 
grand jury in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d). Counsel made a 
motion to dismiss the indictment for this violation but the trial court did not decide it 
until after the guilty verdict had been returned. The majority in Mechanik essentially 
held that in matters involving technical violations of rules of grand juries and in matters 
where such violation had not been brought to the court's attention prior to trial, the 
subsequent guilty verdict would render harmless any conceivable error in the charging 
decision that might have flowed from the violation. The majority opinion noted the high 
cost of retrial in such a situation versus the small effect from a minor technical violation. 
Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion disagreed with this analysis that the 
finding of guilt by itself eliminated any inquiry as to the error within the grand jury 
proceeding. Justice O'Connor stated: 
In my view, when a defendant makes a timely objection to the grand jury 
indictment based on a violation of Rule 6(d), the remedy of dismissal of the 
indictment is appropriate if it is established that the violation substantially 
influenced the grand jury's decision to indict or if there is grave doubt as to 
whether it had such effect.... The focus of the prejudice inquiry should be of the 
effect of the alleged error on the grand jury's decision to indict even if the court 
postpones its decision until the conclusion of the trial. 475 U.S. at 78. 
Subsequently in Bank of Nova Scotia v. U.S., 487 U.S. 255 (1988) the Court 
focused upon quite a different case. There defendant claimed that the prosecution had 
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committed numerous violations of misconduct and irregularities during the grand jury 
proceeding. Prior to trial, the court dismissed the indictments finding violations of 
federal grand jury rules as well as constitutional violations. The Supreme Court majority 
held that mere violation of rules alone were insufficient to dismiss the indictment without 
a harmless error inquiry. The Court adopted the standard propounded by Justice 
O'Connor in her concurring opinion as quoted above. 
While the majority decision did not discuss this new standard in relationship to the 
prior Mechanik guilty verdict standard many courts have assumed that the O'Connor 
analysis is required in all grand jury claims of irregularity regardless of a guilty verdict or 
not. For example, in United States v. Jennings, 991 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1993) the 
defendant was convicted by a jury of assaulting a prison federal official. After conviction 
defendant learned that one of the grand jurors was acquainted with the assault victim. He 
then immediately moved for dismissal of the indictment based upon the prosecution's 
failure to reveal this relationship. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that in a similar case, decided prior 
to Bank of Nova Scotia, a claim that a grand juror was related to a murder victim was 
dismissed. The Court stated: 
We held that Mechanik controlled the issue of whether any error created by 
the prosecutor failing to reveal the grand juror's relationship with the victim was 
harmless. We held that this conviction made harmless the government's failure to 
disclose the relationship between the grand juror and one of the victims and since 
the defendant could not prevail on this claim he was not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue. 
While the holding in Porter [the prior grand juror relation case] is directly 
applicable to this case and would dictate that Jennings' conviction renders 
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harmless the grand juror's relationship with Houston and any prosecutorial 
misconduct related to the disclosure of the relationship, its holdings may have 
been cast in doubt by the Supreme Court's decision in Bank of Nova Scotia v. 
United States. Id at 728-29. (Emphasis added). 
The Court then discussed the Bank of Nova Scotia and its effect on Mechanik. 
In Bank of Nova Scotia the court addressed the appropriate standard for 
determining whether to dismiss an indictment for non-constitutional error prior to 
the conclusion of a trial. The court adopted the standard articulated by Justice 
O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Mechanik: "Dismissal of the indictment is 
appropriate only 'if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the 
grand jury's decision to indict' or if there is 'grave doubts' that the decision to 
indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations... .In Mechanik 
Justice O'Connor has stated that this standard rather than the majority's reliance 
on the defendant's subsequent conviction should be used to determine whether an 
error in grand jury proceedings is harmless. Id. at 729. 
The Mechanik decision involved a claim of a technical violation of witnesses 
being present in the room and in which the motion to dismiss was not decided until after 
the defendant had been convicted by the petit jury. In Bank of Nova Scotia the claimed 
misconduct was that of prosecutors and government witnesses and the motions to dismiss 
occurred before any trial proceeded. This difference in facts and legal procedure has 
created the ambiguity in the courts which the State has noted in its Brief. (State Brief at 
18-19). Many courts fail to properly analyze the facts of their case in relation to 
Mechanik and Bank of Nova Scotia. 
In the instant case, however, Defendant is clearly asserting a non-technical 
violation of prosecutorial misconduct nearly identical to the Bank of Nova Scotia factual 
scenario. In addition, the motion of defense attorneys was made prior to trial and decided 
by the lower court prior to trial. For this reason, therefore, if this case were being tried in 
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a federal court there is little question that the Bank of Nova Scotia standard of review 
formulated by Justice O'Connor would be utilized. 
Decisions of Federal Circuits. The State has recognized the split of circuits in its 
brief and has characterized its proposed standard based upon jury conviction as the 
"majority" while that of the Tenth Circuit cited by Defendant in his Opening Brief as the 
"minority". Defendant agrees that the federal decisions go in all directions, but again 
notes that the particular accusations of grand jury impropriety as well as the procedure of 
objection are critical in each case. Not only are the circuit courts as a whole divided in 
certain standards of review, but panels of the circuit courts also can produce contrary 
opinions. In any event, however, there are substantial authorities from throughout the 
country supporting the proposed standard of Defendant that his case be reviewed under 
the standard formulated by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 
2
 The following cases support this standard: First Circuit - United States v. Valencia-
Lucena, 915 F.2d 506 (1st Cir. 1991) (claim of prosecutorial misconduct governed by 
Bank of Nova Scotia standard of prejudice to the defendants); U.S. v. Flores-Rivera, 56 
F.3d 319 (1st Cir. 1995) (district court may dismiss indictment for errors in grand jury 
proceeding if prejudice to defendant is found). Third Circuit - United States v. Johns, 
858 F.2d 154 (3rd Cir. 1988) ("the grand jury abuses alleged in the present case— 
prosecutorial misconduct in the presentation of evidence,... are different from the 
violation that was at issue in Mechanik which at worst, was technical and, at most, could 
have affected only the grand jury's determination of probable cause. The case before us 
raises the question of whether the government violated defendant's 'right to fundamental 
fairness.' . . . A petit jury's determination of guilt will not moot these issues because they 
go beyond the question the whether the grand juiy had sufficient evidence upon which to 
return an indictment."); United States v. Fisher, 871 F.2d 444 (3rd Cir. 1989) (claims of 
governmental misconduct are not of a technical variety discussed in Mechanik but rather 
are issues that go to the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding and a petit jury's 
determination of guilt will not moot them). Fourth Circuit - United States v. Brewer, 1 
F.3d 1430 (4th Cir. 1993) (prejudice justifying dismissal of indictment exists if 
irregularity substantially influences decision to indict or if there is grave doubt the 
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Tenth Circuit Cases. The State has cited a number of Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals cases showing the alleged inconsistency of application of the standard 
formulated by that court. (State Brief at 19-23). It would serve no useful purpose to 
examine each of these cases as was done by the State since a comprehensive examination 
would have to be made both as to the specific facts of each case and the procedural 
posture of the defense objections. Also, as noted previously, the diversion of decisions 
among the circuits also applies within the circuit too. It is immaterial for purposes of the 
instant appeal whether the Tenth Circuit has found grand jury violation or not since 
Defendant has cited the Tenth Circuit for the formulation of a workable standard, not for 
precedent as to the facts of this case. Since this Court is free to formulate its own 
standard under state constitutional law, the Tenth Circuit cases have been cited by 
Defendant only for the purpose of assisting in such formulation. As to the application of a 
decision to indict was free from substantial influence of such irregularities); United States 
of America v. McDonald's. 61 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 1995) (an indictment may be quashed 
on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct which "substantially influenced the grand jury's 
decision to indict or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the 
substantial influence of such violations."). Seventh Circuit - United States v. Brooks, 
125 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1987) (district court may not dismiss indictment for error in grand 
jury proceeding unless such error prejudiced defendant; "prejudice" occurs if violations 
substantially influence grand jury's decision to indict or if there is grave doubt that the 
decision to indict was free from substantial influence of the violation.); U.S. v. Anderson, 
61 F.3d 1290 (7th Cir. 1995) (same standard articulated). Ninth Circuit - United States 
v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only if 
it is established that the violations substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to 
indict or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the substantial 
influence of such violation). Tenth Circuit - See authorities listed in Defendant's 
Opening Brief, pp. 36-37 and State Brief, pp. 19-23. Eleventh Circuit - United States v. 
Jennings, 991 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1993) (dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only if 
it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to 
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federal constitutional standard, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court would 
necessarily control. 
Application of the Tenth Circuit Standard to Facts of This Case. The State has 
obviously not wanted to place all of its eggs in one basket. While it essentially maintains 
that no review of the grand jury proceeding is possible because Defendant was found 
guilty by a petit jury (State Brief at 14-21) it apparently does not feel secure in only 
advancing this position. In addition, the state spends considerable time in also applying 
the facts of this case to the proposed Tenth Circuit standard. (State Brief at 21-42). 
Obviously, the State considers this standard to be of merit or it would have just ignored 
the arguments of Defendant. 
Activeness of Grand Jury. The State argues that the grand jury in this case was 
"active" which necessarily militates against a finding that the grand jury's independence 
was infringed upon by the alleged errors claimed by Defendant. (State Brief at 23). 
Many of the federal cases involving grand juries cited by both parties involved months of 
testimony before the respective grand juries before indictments were returned. The 
extensiveness of these federal grand jury proceedings illustrate the high degree of proof 
required of federal prosecutors in proving their case to a federal grand jury even though 
the prosecutors have essentially complete control over the proceedings. The "activity" of 
such a grand jury is certainly a relevant measurement of the effect a prosecutor may hav€ 
upon the grand jury's independent review of evidence. 
indict or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the substantial 
influence of such violations.) 
l l 
In the instant case, however, the entire grand jury proceeding lasted only one 
day—March 15, 1995. It seems completely subjective to characterize this short 
proceeding as involving "active" or "inactive" participation by grand jury members. The 
entire transcript of 135 pages is contained as a separate addendum to this Brief. Although 
some of the grand jurors asked an occasional question or made an occasional statement, 
there is nothing in the short record to show that they assumed any role independent of the 
prosecutor. They were essentially the audience and the prosecutor was the emcee. In 
many instances the very questions which the State now argues shows the independence of 
the grand jurors were quickly answered by the prosecutor and detectives with personal 
opinions and hearsay narratives. The grand jurors completely relied upon the prosecutor 
and the detectives in formulating their opinion as to Defendant's guilt and did not have 
the opportunity to exercise their independent judgment of untainted evidence. 
Defendant will now examine the arguments made by the State with relation to each 
error he has claimed. 
A. The Prosecutor Threatened Defendant's Right To Fundamental Fairness By 
Flagrantly Utilizing Other Unrelated Murders To Induce The Grand Jury 
To Indict. 
The State maintains that the information concerning the other murders was merely 
an incidental event which occurred because of a grand juror's question. (State Brief at 
26-27). The State makes no attempt, however, to explain why the grand jury was shown 
a book of pictures and histories of the other girls, (March 15 Tr. pp. 8-14) or why the 
prosecutor informed the jurors that the families of all the victims were concerned about 
what happened in this case. (March Tr. at 130). It is difficult to imagine how normal 
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grand jurors would not be swayed to indict the defendant when they saw not only the 
picture and life story of the victim Lisa Strong but also three other young girls who were 
brutally murdered for no reason. Obviously, such conduct would never be permitted in a 
courtroom and should not have been attempted by the prosecutors who knew they were 
free from any judicial supervision. 
B. The prosecutor threatened Defendant's right to fundamental fairness by 
intentionally presenting improper and inaccurate character evidence of the 
defendant including prior convictions. 
The State made no explanation for the need of the highly inflammatory testimony 
concern Defendant's alleged criminal record and his bad acts such as kicking a pregnant 
girl down the stairs. (State Brief at 29-31). It also makes no attempt to suggest that the 
statements concerning Defendant's criminal record or prior acts is in fact true. Instead, 
the State complains that Defendant has cited no record support for the factual allegations 
and therefore they must be disregarded on appeal. (State Brief at 29). 
Defendant's police record is contained in his Presentence Report which is a sealed 
part of this record on appeal. Even as to those prior criminal convictions which are not in 
dispute, the State has offered no explanation for the need of the grand jury to know 
except to inflame it by making Defendant appear to be a bad person who needed to stay 
incarcerated and not be released. 
The Federal District Court of Maryland dismissed an indictment based on similar 
grounds. The Court stated: 
Indeed, the use of Vetere's record crossed the line from being simply 
reckless to being the 'fundamentally unfair" tactic of depicting a grand jury target 
as a "bad person[s] and thereby obtaining] an indictment for independent crimes." 
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The flow of the questions to Agent Sager and the colloquy while he was excused, 
establishes that the testimony about Vetere9 s record was elicited to help push a 
wavering grand jury over the edge. Put together, the use of the ten-year old article, 
the characterization of Vetere as a drug user with a "history of... drug related 
arrests," from a single incident in which he was charged with a drug sale, the 
representation that he had been convicted of offenses that he, in fact, had never 
been charged with, and the misrepresentation of charges of which he had been 
convicted all bear not on whether Vetere committed this crime, but on a "bad-guy" 
theory. U.S. v. Vetere, 663 F.Supp. 381, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). (Citations 
omitted). 
C. The Prosecutor Threatened The Defendant's Right To Fundamental 
Fairness By Improperly Explaining Away Discrepancies In The Statements 
Of Witnesses And In Expressing Personal Opinions On Questions Of Fact. 
The transcript of the grand jury proceeding speaks for itself. It is impossible in 
this complex appeal to cite every line or passage in which either the prosecutor or the two 
police detectives voiced their personal opinions to the grand jurors or vouched for 
discredited various witnesses. The State has attempted to put its own "spin" on those 
passages previously noted by the defendant in his Opening Brief. (State Brief at 31-35). 
Again, it would serve no useful purpose to comment upon the State's editorial 
observations of how it believes the various statements made affected the grand jurors9 
perception of the evidence. Defendant submits that the proper inquiry is to read the entire 
transcript as a whole in order to understand the overreaching efforts of the prosecutor and 
the detectives. 
Even from the cold, hard record of the transcript itself it is apparent that a very 
informal atmosphere existed in this proceeding. Rather than the prosecutors presenting 
the evidence in their capacity as government agents and the police formally testifying to 
the various facts they had uncovered in their investigation, both the prosecutors and the 
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police took on the role of advisors and confidants of the grand jurors. This relaxed 
atmosphere undoubtedly resulted in many of the casual responses given by these 
governmental officials to the questions of the grand jurors. 
In United States v. Breslin, 916 F.Supp. 438 (D.Pa. 1996) an indictment was 
dismissed because of prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury. The Court noted 
that the grand jury does not belong to the prosecutor but that its responsibilities include 
both the determination of whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been 
committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. 
(Citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The District Court of 
Pennsylvania then stated: 
The prosecutor has an obligation not to engage in technique, either 
knowingly or inadvertently, to curry favor with the grand jurors and leave them to 
abrogate their role as unbiased fact-finders. There, as here, the informal 
atmosphere between the prosecutors and the grand jurors allowed the prosecutor to 
improperly comment upon the credibility and strength of the evidence. Throughout 
the grand jury proceedings, the prosecutor improperly characterized the evidence 
and inserted his opinion regarding the strength and weight of the evidence. Id. at 
443. 
In one such example the prosecutor commented that a statement supposedly made by the 
defendant was "just an outright lie." The Court stated: 
Such statements and characterizations are clearly inappropriate, and the 
Court is deeply concerned that such statements might unduly influence the grand 
jury and usurp its role as factfinder. Id. 
The prosecutor and the detectives in the instant case did not present objective 
evidence they had gathered but instead forcefully presented it in such a way to obtain an 
indictment. Instead of letting the grand jurors decide for themselves the credibility of 
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various statements of witnesses as they would do in a jury trial, the government witnesses 
repeatedly "assisted" the jurors in their decision making process. The numerous opinions 
of these government witnesses and prosecutor decided which witnesses should be 
believed or which story of which witness should be believed. The United States Supreme 
Court stated the danger when a prosecutor exceeds his authority: 
The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing 
his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused posed two dangers: such 
comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but 
known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus 
jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence 
presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of 
the government and may induce the jury to trust the government's judgment rather 
than its own view of the evidence. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 
(1984). 
Because prosecutors and police detectives do not normally have an available 
dialogue during trial between themselves and a petit jury, this type of undue influence 
upon fact finding would not occur. 
In this particular case these government agents overstepped their boundaries 
thereby calling into question whether the grand jurors would have indicted Defendant 
absent their unauthorized intrusion. 
D. The Prosecutor Threatened The Defendant's Right To Fundamental 
Fairness By Failing To Present Exculpatory Evidence In Violation Of 
Section 77-10A-13(5¥C). U.C.A. And Article L Section 7 Of The Utah 
Constitution. 
Defendant again disagrees with the State's claim that state constitutional 
application is not "properly before this Court". (State Brief at 36, fii. 18). While federal 
law does not require exculpatory evidence be presented to a grand jury there are many 
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states which require such evidence under their own state constitutions or statutory law. 
Utah has enacted such a statute and this Court is free to interpret it under previous state 
law or analogous federal law. The Due Process Clause of the State Constitution can 
clearly be applied to this state law which imposes on the prosecutor a duty to present 
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. 
A comparison between the grand jury testimony of Tina Schroyer (Mar. Tr. at 72-
92) with the testimony upon cross examination at trial (See Appellant's Opening Brief, 
pp. 21-22) and the testimony of Michael Staples before the grand jury (Mar. Tr. at 4-72) 
with his testimony upon cross examination at trial (Appellant's Opening Brief at 11-13) 
shows that the grand jury was not given exculpatory contradictory statements of these 
witnesses. 
Although the United States Supreme Court in Williams ruled that exculpatory 
evidence was not required before a grand jury, it also held that a district court's 
supervisory power can be used to dismiss an indictment because of misconduct that 
occurs in violation of grand jury rules drawn up by Congress. 504 U.S. at 36. Under the 
federal system there is no rule to provide exculpatory evidence. Utah law Section 77-
10A-13(5)(c), U.C.A. places this mandate upon the prosecutor. 
Next, the State argues that even though exculpatory evidence is required under 
Utah law that the prior inconsistent statements of these witnesses would not qualify and 
that the definition of exculpatory has not been addressed in Utah "and has not been 
resolved with great consistency by other jurisdictions." (State Brief at 38). This state 
claim is groundless. 
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There is no question but that under federal law exculpatory evidence includes prior 
inconsistent statements of key witnesses. For example, in Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct. 
1555 (1995) the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor failed in its Brady v. Maryland 
obligation to provide to the defense attorney statements of eye witnesses which were 
inconsistent to their trial testimony. The Supreme Court noted: 
Damage to the prosecution's case would not have been confined to 
evidence of the eye witnesses, for Beanie's various statements would have raised 
opportunities to attack not only the probative value of crucial physical evidence 
and the circumstances in which it was found, but the thoroughness and even the 
good faith of the investigation, as well. By the State's own admission, Beanie was 
essential to its investigation and indeed "made the case" against Kyles. Contrary 
to what one might hope for from such a source, however, Beanie's statements to 
the police were replete with inconsistencies and would have allowed the jury to 
infer that Beanie was anxious to see Kyles arrested for Dye's murder. Their 
disclosure would have revealed a remarkably uncritical attitude on the part of the 
police. Id. at 1571. 
Numerous state courts have also held that evidence which can impeach critical 
witnesses is clearly exculpatory under state and federal law. See People v. Pinholster, 824 
P.2d 571 (Cal. 1992); State v. Johnson. 816 P.2d 364 (Ida. App. 1991); State v. Aikins, 
932 P.2d 408 (Kan. 1997); Roberts v. State, 881 P.2d 1 (Nev. 1994); and Keams v. State, 
920 P.2d 632 (Wyo. 1996). 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in interpreting a similar state rule requiring 
exculpatory information be provided to the grand jury stated the following: 
Where, as here, evidence known to the prosecutor would greatly undermine 
the credibility of an important witness, the prosecutor must at least alert the grand 
jury to the existence of that evidence. If the grand jury were not made aware of 
circumstances which undermine the credibility of evidence that is likely to have 
affected their decision to indict, then the appropriate remedy may be dismissal of 
the indictment. Commonwealth v. Connor, 467 N.E.2d 1340, 1351 (Mass. 1984). 
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Finally, the policy reasons behind such a requirement are noted by one scholarly 
journal: 
The grand jury's constitutional role is to insure that the executive is not 
maliciously or arbitrarily pursuing the putative defendant without a good faith 
belief that the target has actually violated the law. Yet the grand jury cannot 
combat executive abuse of power effectively without the disclosure rule. The 
prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence that tends to negate one of the essential 
elements of his prima facie case may be a likely indicator that the government is 
motivated less by a desire to prosecute than by a desire to target a citizen 
maliciously. Without the disclosure rule, prosecutors can easily fool modem 
grand juries into thinking that no substantial evidence that undermines their case 
exists. The disclosure rule would guard against such grand jury deception. 
"Analysis of Recent Supreme Court Decisions/9106 Harvard Law Rev. 163, 197 
(1992). 
The State in its parting shot argues that because the petit jury heard all of the 
inconsistencies of Staples and Schroyer that it must be assumed arguendo that these 
statements were insufficient to have resulted in any different decision by the grand jury. 
(State Brief at 38). This argument is completely without merit. 
First, the State is arguing that its proposed standard of trial jury guilt determination 
dissolves any prosecutorial misconduct. If this standard is in fact adopted by this Court 
then nothing that occurs in a grand jury proceeding can ever be reviewed after a verdict is 
returned. As noted earlier, this type of injustice is not allowed in most jurisdictions. 
Second, the purpose of the statutory obligation to show exculpatory evidence is to 
allow the grand jury to decide if a proposed target defendant should go through the ordeal 
of criminal indictment. If a prosecutor's case is weak then an indictment should not be 
entered. The fact that the prosecution can later supplement its case with additional 
witnesses or other evidence is immaterial to the grand jurors' initial decision. Since 
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Schroyer and Staples were the only non-governmental witnesses called, their credibility 
was critical in the grand jury's evaluation. On the other hand, during the jury trial a 
number of additional witnesses testified which may have swung the pendulum for 
conviction in the mind of the petit jury. The prosecution should not be allowed to 
deceive a grand jury in order to buy it time to find sufficient evidence to present to a trial 
For these reasons, therefore, the prosecutor threatened fundamental fairness by 
failing to inform the grand jury of the numerous inconsistencies and lies of these two key 
witnesses. 
E. The Prosecutor Threatened The Defendant's Right To Fundamental 
Fairness By Improperly Presenting Hearsay Evidence To The Grand Jury. 
The question of hearsay testimony during the grand jury proceeding presents 
another intellectual challenge in an attempt to navigate the labyrinth of Utah's 
constitutional law, statutory law, and court rules and decisions. In order to put the 
arguments of Defendant in perspective it is necessary to quickly review this historical 
maze. 
This Court in 1980 ruled in the case of State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (1980) 
that the Utah Constitution forbids the use of hearsay testimony at a preliminary hearing 
and that an attempted effort by the Legislature to create a rule of hearsay exception was 
unconstitutional. The statutory law relating to preliminary hearings was contained in 
Section 77-10-1 through 77-12-5, U.C.A. (1953). On the other hand, the grand jury law 
stated: "The grand jury should receive no other evidence than is given by witnesses under 
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oath or affirmation, or documentary evidence, or the disposition of a witness taken as 
provided by law. The grand jury shall receive only legal evidence." $77-11-2, U.C.A. 
(1953). In addition, Rule 1101(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence was apparently enacted 
in 1974 and stated that the Rules of Evidence do not apply to grand jury proceedings. 
Thus, prior to 1990 the law was clear. Hearsay evidence could not be used in 
preliminary hearings because of the Utah Constitution. On the other hand, there was no 
specific regulation relating to hearsay testimony in a grand jury proceeding and 
assumably it could be utilized as long as it was "legal". Prior to 1990 had a grand jury 
been convened it was essentially free to use any evidence without restriction. 
In 1990 the Legislature repealed the prior grand jury law and replaced it with the 
"Grand Jury Reform Act" contained now in Section 77-10A-1 through 77-10A-20. 
Section 77-10A-13(5)(a) was enacted which now states that a "grand jury may receive 
hearsay evidence only under the same provisions and limitations that apply to preliminary 
hearings." Since the Anderson case interpreting the Utah Constitution was still 
applicable, a grand jury meeting after 1990 would not be able to utilize hearsay testimony 
because it could not be used in a preliminary hearing. 
This Court in State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995) declined to overrule the 
Anderson case and to allow "reliable" hearsay at preliminary hearings. This 1995 
decision was interpreting Utah law as of 1993 (the time of the preliminary hearing) which 
again would have forbidden hearsay testimony in either a preliminary hearing or a grand 
jury proceeding. 
21 
In 1994 an amendment to the Utah Constitution was made to Article I Section 12 
which now allowed "reliable hearsay evidence" to be used in a preliminary hearing. The 
Constitution did not define "reliable hearsay evidence" but merely stated "as defined by 
statute or rule". Thus, applying Section 77-10A-13(5)(a) to the newly enacted 
constitutional amendment would result in a grand jury being able to utilize hearsay 
evidence but being restricted to only "reliable hearsay". It is thus apparent that the 
Legislature restricted the prior ability of a grand jury to hear evidence. 
The last step in this process was the amendment by this Court to Rule 1101 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence in 1995 which states, "In a preliminary examination, nothing in 
these rules shall be construed to prevent the admission of reliable hearsay evidence." 
It is Defendant's analysis, therefore, that the present state of the law allows the use 
of "reliable hearsay evidence" in both preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings. 
The next question to be asked is, "What is reliable hearsay evidence?" 
Since the term has not been defined in the Constitution the answer to this question 
is still subject to speculation. Judge Davis in a concurring opinion in State v. Nelson 
Rodriguez-Lopl 954 P.2d 1290 (Utah App. 1998) offered the following definition: 
Hearsay is reliable, and hence admissible, when it falls under one of the 
exceptions to the hearsay rules.... Rule 7(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides "a preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and 
laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court." Thus, although hearsay is 
admissible in the preliminary examination to establish probable cause, it must be 
reliable. Accordingly, reliability may be established if the hearsay falls within an 
exception to the hearsay rule or upon a "showing of particularized guarantees of 
truthworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), id at 1294. (Concurring 
opinion). 
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Since the grand jury in the instant case met in March of 1995 it is therefore 
assumed that "reliable hearsay evidence" was permitted. The testimony of the two 
detectives, however, fail to meet this requirement. The State has offered no suggestion 
as to what Rule of Evidence would permit the hearsay testimony of these detectives. The 
long narrative statement, for example, of Detective Michael George (Mar. Tr. at 8-44) 
contains hearsay, double hearsay, and complete speculation and yet is presented as 
absolute truth. No attempt was made to advise the jury of the hearsay nature of his 
testimony. The testimony of Detective Oliver was also full of unreliable hearsay 
statements and opinion. (Mar. Tr. 93-122). 
The prosecution did not attempt to utilize these witnesses at trial to give this same 
hearing testimony since it was obvious that such testimony would not be admissible. 
Defendant submits that under the new statutory and constitutional scheme a grand jury 
proceeding requires the same standard of hearing evidence to establish reliability as 
would the trial itself. Here, that requirement was clearly not met. 
The State claimed that Tim Robinson was an unavailable witness and therefore it 
was necessary for the detectives to "fill in the gap" concerning his hearsay statements. 
However, he was not truly unavailable and the prosecutor intentionally deceived the 
grand jury into believing that they could not call him personally to testify. The actions of 
the prosecutor with regard to Robinson, therefore, went beyond evidentiary rules of 
admission and into further prosecutorial misconduct. 
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In U.S. v. Breslin, 916 F.Supp. 438 (D.Pa. 1996) the Court found that the 
prosecutor had improperly led the jury to believe that it was not entitled to request live 
witness testimony or that the live testimony was unavailable. The Court, in dismissing 
the indictment, stated: 
It is axiomatic that a grand jury has the right to call witnesses. The grand 
jurors were instructed by the empanelling judge in his opening charge that they 
had such a right. However, the prosecutor's repeated suggestion that the witnesses 
were unable to appear live, a statement which was false since all the witnesses' 
whereabouts were known, could easily have left a misimpression with the grand 
jurors. Id. at 444. 
The State argues that the use of impermissible hearsay evidence is not reviewable 
since to do so 6Cwould be to label all federal grand jury proceedings fundamentally 
unfair." (State Brief at 41). This argument is spurious since the State itself noted that the 
United States Supreme Court has "declined to enforce the hearsay rule in grand jury 
proceedings" (State Brief at 40) and therefore there is no prohibition of any type in 
federal grand juries as to the use of hearsay evidence. The Utah statutory and 
constitutional scheme is quite different and clearly restricts the type of hearsay evidence 
that is permissible. 
If no rule of review was permitted then a prosecutor would be free to introduce 
completely unreliable hearsay evidence in a grand jury proceeding without fear. While 
the Legislature has attempted to create equal systems of justice in preliminary hearings 
and grand jury proceedings, this attempt would be smashed if the State's argument was 
adopted that no judicial review is possible after conviction. 
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Here, not only did the State improperly rely upon hearsay evidence but also 
deceived the grand jurors into believing it was the only evidence available when they 
clearly wanted to have Tim Robinson before them to explain the discrepancies which 
were created by the numerous versions and inconsistencies of the stories. 
F. The Individual And Combined Instances Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Requires A Finding That The Defendant's Right To Fundamental Fairness 
Was Violated And A Dismissal Of The Indictment. 
In United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1979) the Court was 
faced with several instances of serious misconduct including: the prosecutor's 
introduction of admittedly irrelevant, highly prejudicial testimony; the prosecutor's 
reading of transcripts that seriously distorted the testimony without telling the grand jury 
live testimony was available; and the introduction of hearsay testimony in a manner 
leaving the grand jury to believe it was first person observation. The Court concluded 
that, "the cumulative effect of the above errors and indiscretions, none of which alone 
might have been enough to tip the scales, operated to the defendant's prejudice by 
producing a biased grand jury." 
This same type of conduct exists in the instant case. While thus far grand jury 
indictments have been far and few between in Utah, there is nothing to stop the 
prosecutors of this state from deciding to utilize grand jury proceedings as the favorite 
method to begin criminal proceedings. Thus, it is important that judicial rules be 
established for these prosecutors to follow. It is equally important that this Court adopt a 
judicial standard of review of grand jury proceedings regardless of whether the defendant 
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This Court noted in the Anderson decision, supra, that the benefits a defendant 
receives in a preliminary hearing includes the discovery of evidence in the cross 
examination of accusers. 612 P.2dat780. A grandjury proceeding has none of these 
benefits to a defendant and therefore the procedures utilized in a grandjury proceeding 
must be extremely strict to eliminate vindictive indictments which otherwise would not 
occur before a neutral magistrate in a preliminary hearing. The deterrence of 
prosecutorial misconduct or police misconduct must be considered in formulating a 
standard of review to be used in grandjury proceedings. As one scholar stated: 
The Fourth Amendment creates almost no absolute protections; if the 
government possesses adequate suspicion and follows proper procedures, virtually 
no search is prohibited, no matter how intrusive. If intrusions can be justified by 
the likelihood that seizable items will be discovered, why does not actual 
discovery of seizable items serve to justify the intrusion, regardless of the 
existence of probable cause ex ante? 
The answer is straight forward: Such an ex post viewpoint would 
encourage the police to engage in widespread searches in the hope of finding 
something useful, however unlikely that would appear ahead of time. Thus, the 
very reason that some successful searches are found to violate the Fourth 
Amendment—the reason that the determination whether an intrusion is justified is 
made ex ante rather than ex post—is to deter. Daniel J. Meltzer, "Deterring 
Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials," 88 Columbia Law Rev. 
247, 272 (1988). 
This same deterrence is critical in formulating a workable grandjury appellate 
review standard to guard against prosecutorial and police misconduct. 
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POINT n 
A COMBINATION OF EVIDENTIARY ERRORS 
OCCURRING AT TRIAL WAS EXTREMELY PREJUDICIAL 
TO DEFENDANT AND ABSENT THESE ERRORS 
THERE IS A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT 
THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A MORE FAVORABLE 
RESULT FOR THE DEFENDANT. 
Since the errors relating to Defendant's actual trial are based upon existing law 
and its routine application, Defendant will devote only a fraction of the space in this 
Reply Brief which was spent on the unique grand jury standards and application. The 
main purpose herein is to clarify or refute claims made by the State in its Brief (pp. 42-
68) which are inaccurate or distorted. Defendant essentially relies upon his Opening 
Brief for the comprehensive legal analysis applicable to each of his arguments. 
A. The Exclusion of the Testimony of James Sherrard and/or Impeaching 
Testimony of Frank Hatton Ward and Dennis Couch Was Prejudicial Error. 
1. Testimony of James Sherrard. The State claims that the defendant had a 
'trial strategy" to establish Sherrard's unavailability as a witness so that prior hearsay 
statements he made to investigators could be introduced to the jury. (State Brief at 44). 
This claim is completely unsupported by the record. First, Defendant's counsel informed 
the trial court shortly before Sherrard was scheduled to testify, "We did not know until 
just a few minutes ago that Mr. Sherrard would be taking the Fifth." (R. 1493-94). 
Counsel further stated "We had proposed to ask Mr. James Sherrard to testify today." (R. 
1491). There is nothing in these statements, therefore, to indicate an effort on the part of 
defense counsel to avoid Sherrard's direct testimony for the purported hearsay testimony 
of the investigators. A review of the transcript of the new trial hearing (R. 1689-94; 
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1730-37) clearly refutes any claim by the State or finding by the lower court that defense 
counsel had strategically planned for Sherrard to not testify and to claim the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Next, although the State asserts that defense counsel's action amounted to "invited 
error" (State Brief at 48-49) which is denied by Defendant, this same claim can be levied 
against the prosecutor. The State correctly notes that at the conclusion of the defense 
case when defense counsel renewed the request to have Mr. Sherrard testify on the 
grounds that he was improperly allowed to plead the Fifth Amendment, the prosecutor 
stated, "I think he's entitled to take the Fifth." (R. 1570) (State Brief at 45). 
Subsequently, at the motion for new trial hearing the prosecutor reversed himself and 
admitted, "In order for him to take the Fifth, he's got to be able to claim some privilege. I 
don't think he did that. I don't think he should have been able to take the Fifth 
Amendment in this case...." The prosecutor also stated again, " . . . I don't think James 
Sherrard should have been entitled to take the Fifth." (R. 1718). Thus, the prosecutor 
incorrectly advised the lower court as to the status of Sherrard's Fifth Amendment claim 
resulting in the Court's denial of defense counsel's effort to call Sherrard as a witness. It 
was certainly not the strategy of defense counsel to calculate a misstatement of law by the 
prosecutor. 
After realizing that Sherrard was allowed to improperly plead the Fifth 
Amendment, the prosecutor during the motion for new trial hearing shifted his own 
strategy. Now, he claimed that the real reason for allowing Sherrard to take the Fifth was 
that Whittle had threatened Sherrard. (R. 713-14) (State Brief at 46). This belated effort 
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of the State to justify Sherrard's wrongful taking of the Fifth must be rejected for two 
reasons. First, the alleged threat was never contained in the original trial record and was 
not made a basis of any ruling of the lower court. The prosecutor during the new trial 
hearing stated, "I don't know if we ever made a record of it." (R. 1713). And the lower 
court stated, "I don't recall if that got on the record or not." (R. 1719). The State cannot 
rely upon arguments not contained in the record to support rulings made during trial. 
Second, even if it is assumed arguendo that an evidentiary hearing was held and a 
guard testified that Whittle made the statement claimed, such statement does not 
constitute evidence of Whittle's effort to eliminate Sherrard from testifying and in fact 
can be viewed as encouragement to testify. Thus, this red herring of Whittle's comments 
to Sherrard was not preserved before the lower court and is not a proper argument in this 
appeal to justify any exclusion of evidence. 
Next, the State claims that any error in permitting Sherrard to take the Fifth 
Amendment was "unpreserved, invited, and favored Defendant." The State contends the 
defendant failed to preserve the claim of error by objecting to Sherrard's Fifth 
Amendment assertion. (State Brief at 48). A valid objection was later made prior to the 
close of Defendant's case and upon the prosecutor's insistence that the Fifth Amendment 
claim was proper the lower court denied the motion. (R. 1570). Although the State 
argues that this objection was on a different grounds than now urged on this appeal (State 
Brief at 48, fii. 19) in actuality defense counsel were correctly arguing that Sherrard had 
no right to claim a Fifth Amendment privilege since he was not in jeopardy by his 
testimony. 
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If, the State's assertion is correct that these objections failed to properly preserve 
this important claim then Defendant again asserts his claim of ineffective counsel and the 
defendant relies upon his prior argument in his opening Brief (Appellant's Brief at 65-
66). The State retorts that the failure to object was ''tactical" but cites no record 
transcript to sustain this position based upon defense counsel's statements or action. 
(State Brief at 50). On the other hand, the statement of defense counsel during the 
transcript of the new trial hearing clearly shows that excluding Sherrard's testimony was 
not planned and was not a strategy of the defense team. Defense counsel asserted that it 
was "plain error" that neither the defense attorneys nor the Court recognized that the prior 
deposition testimony of Sherrard eliminated his Fifth Amendment claim. (R. 1733-35). 
Finally, the claim by the State that excluding Sherrard was in Defendant's favor 
was also idle speculation and self-serving inclusions. Had the jury actually heard 
Sherrard testify that Tim Robinson shot the victim, the effect would have been far greater 
than any statements related by investigators as to previous interviews. 
2. Testimony of Investigators. The admissibility of testimony of the two 
investigators is a separate sub-issue to that of Sherrard's testimony. Had Sherrard actually 
testified at trial then denied implicating Tim Robinson in the murder, the two 
investigators would then have been permitted to testify under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as to the 
inconsistent statements. Since Sherrard did not testify because of his erroneous assertion 
of a Fifth Amendment right, the Rule 801(d)(1)(A) provision is immaterial to this appeal. 
On the other hand, rightfully or wrongfully, Sherrard asserted a Fifth Amendment 
privilege. At that point in time he immediately became "unavailable". State v. White, 
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671 P.2d 191 (Utah 1983). The question then became whether these investigators could 
testify as to his hearsay statements under Rule 804. 
Trial counsel properly argued that Rule 804(3) or 804(5) allowed the investigators 
to testify as to Sherrard's prior statements. (R. 1492-94). Defense counsel argued that 
subsection (5) was applicable and that the statements met all of the necessary criteria. (R. 
1493). The State objected to the use of subsection (5) on the basis that Sherrard's 
statements were not credible since he had previously disavowed them in a civil deposition 
in 1993. (R. 1496). Accordingly, the Court stated, "Under subsection (5), the Court is of 
the opinion that the statements do not bear sufficient indicia of reliability or 
trustworthiness that could allow them to come in under that particular provision." (R. 
1497). 
The lower court erred in refusing to admit the statements of the investigators under 
Rule 804(5) merely because Sherrard had recanted them under oath. If inconsistent or 
recanted sworn statements were a criteria of truthfulness, then many of the State's own 
witnesses should not have been allowed to testify at trial since they all contained highly 
contradictory and inconsistent statements. It is for the jury, not the Court, to weigh the 
credibility of these statements. As noted in Defendant's Opening Brief, the statements 
were given to Hatton Ward after a Miranda warning, were tape recorded, and were 
corroborated by Couch years later. (Appellant's Brief at 64). The State has made no 
comment as to why these circumstances do not allow a finding of trustworthiness for 
purposes of Rule 804. It is '"trustworthiness" not "truthfulness" which is the focus of 
inquiry. 
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The Court of Appeals in State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (Utah App. 1989) (cert, 
denied, 804 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1990)) held that a statement was not deemed trustworthy if 
the declarant was currying favor with the authorities by inculpating defendant and 
exculpating the declarant. Conversely, if a declarant exculpates a defendant and places 
himself in more jeopardy a finding of trustworthinesss should be made. 
The statements of Sherrard who was acknowledged by many witnesses to have 
been present on the date of the murder at Robinson's house was extremely critical to 
Defendant's case since his testimony would have given the jury an alternate perpetrator 
of the murder. It was for the jury, not the court or the prosecutor, to determine which of 
the many conflicting statements in this case by the numerous witnesses should be 
believed or not believed. 
As to this issue, therefore, it is immaterial whether Sherrard was properly allowed 
to take the Fifth Amendment or not. At the moment of trial, the defense attorneys and 
court believed he could. As such, the defense attorneys were entitled to assert the Rule 
804 exceptions to allow the testimony of their investigators to be presented to the jury. 
The lower court clearly erred in failing to allow this critical testimony to be presented. 
B. The Inclusion of the Testimony of Derald Ross was Prejudicial 
Error. 
1. Admissibility of the "Confession". The use of cellmate confessions 
always entails a high risk of reliability since (1) the declarant is himself in prison or jail 
and therefore is obviously of questionable character and (2) the incentives and threats 
which occur in a prison setting by inmates and officials can create pressure to falsely 
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testify. D'Agostino v. State, 823 P.2d 283, 285 (Nev. 1992); McNeil v. State, 551 S.2d 
151 (Miss. 1989). Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence requires the exclusion of evidence 
when the prejudicial effect outweighs any probative value. Evidence that is inherently 
unreliable has minimal probative value. State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1220 (Utah 
1989). 
Whenever a cellmate testifies against a defendant an automatic dilemma 
immediately occurs. If the defense counsel cross examine him as to any incentives or 
threats occurring because of the prison setting a jury is immediately informed that the 
defendant is also serving time for another crime. If, on the other hand, the witness' status 
is kept from the jury then the defense counsel is unable to effectively cross examine the 
witness as to the most impeachable circumstances of prison life. 
In the instant case this exact scenario occurred. The lower court ruled that the 
statements made to Derald Ross were admissible. In order to protect Defendant's prison 
status, therefore, defense counsel avoided examining him as to his prison environment 
with the defendant and allowed the prosecution to portray him in his current status as a 
part-time tow truck driver. The purported confession of Defendant could have applied to 
the killing of any Utah woman. See discussion infra regarding similar statements in the 
next subsection. An alleged "confession" must at least identify the victim or be specific 
enough to place circumstances as to the event. 
2. State's Failure to Provide Prison Information. The State does not 
contend that it actually timely sent to the defense team relevant information about Ross 
prior to his reliability hearing. (State Brief at 58). Instead, the State deflects its own 
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failure to comply with discovery requests by insisting that the defendant knew about the 
altercation and therefore the State had no obligation to present the Brady material to the 
defense team. Since Defendant was serving a prison sentence at the State Penitentiary 
during this time of trial, there may have been a number of reasons that he did not want to 
"snitch" on Ross or inform his attorneys that he had been accused of making sexual 
requests to him. None of the cases cited by the State involve the failure to disclose 
information by a prisoner concerning his conduct with other inmates. 
Had the State properly supplied defense counsel with the prison history of this 
witness then no claim could now be made. More importantly, since the lower court 
precluded another inmate from testifying based upon the same problem of an altercation, 
it is highly probable the court would have done the same in Mr. Ross' case had he or 
defense counsel been aware of the problem. 
C. The Inclusion of the Testimony of Doug Bateman, Janet Batemen, 
and Terrence Robinson Was Prejudicial Error. 
Defense counsel in this case filed a motion in limine to exclude the unreliable 
testimony of these witnesses. (R. 366-367). Defense counsel cited Rule 403 as the basis 
for this motion. Again, in oral argument before the trial court, Rule 402 and 403 were 
relied upon by defense counsel. (R. 801-10). While it is true that the State v. Trover case 
was not specifically cited, Defendant knows of no rule that states a specific case must be 
cited to support an argument based upon a rule of evidence. (State Brief at 61). 
The prosecutor argues "since the record suggests no other homicide to which 
Defendant might have been referring, his statement that he 'capped a bitch' was not 
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ambiguous." (State Brief at 60). This statement is incorrect. If a defendant is quoted as 
having said "I robbed a bank" or "I shot a cop" with nothing more, would the Rules of 
Evidence permit such statement to be introduced into evidence? It may be, for example, 
that the declarant has robbed a number of banks or has shot a number of police officers. 
The relevance inquiry under Rules 401, 402 and 403 is whether such a statement is 
relevant to proving the robbing of a particular bank or the shooting of a particular 
policeman. If other criminal conduct is relevant then it must be admitted under Rule 
404(d). Otherwise, it is inadmissible since it prejudices a factfinder that the declarant is a 
bad person who has or may have perpetrated other crimes. 
The statement "I capped a bitch downtown" or "I capped a bitch" is no more 
relevant than the previous examples. In fact, as to the reference of "downtown" it is even 
less relevant since the geographic location of Lisa Strong's murder was not downtown. 
Allowing these three witnesses to testify as to these irrelevant statements to this 
crime was extremely prejudicial. No effort was made by the prosecution to admit these 
criminal statements under Rule 404(b). The State v. Trover decision specifically 
excludes statements that are "highly ambiguous". It is immaterial whether Defendant 
Whittle had ever "pled guilty to killing any other Salt Lake woman" or whether the record 
indicated "he had committed another homicide before the summer of 1986." (State Brief 
at 62). There is nothing in the Rules of Evidence requiring the defendant to prove that his 
purported statement refers to another crime. Rather, it is the obligation of the prosecutor 
to show that the statement is relevant to the indicted crime before the trier of fact. Finally, 
it is not "grossly unfair" to require a purported confession to specify some degree of time, 
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place and victim. (State Brief at 62). Unless such a specific statement is made it does not 
become relevant to the crime charged. 
D. The Inclusions of Portions of the Testimony of James F. Bell 
was Prejudicial Error. 
The State argued that the damaging statement of Detective Bell concerning Tina 
Schroyer's assistance in another homicide was highly relevant. (State Brief at 63-64). 
The State cites two Utah cases involving the sufficiency of informant testimony in an 
affidavit of probable cause for drug search warrants. Espinoza and Jordan, (State Brief at 
63-64). These cases have nothing to do with live testimony in a matter such as this. In 
addition, it was never claimed that Schroyer was a police informant. 
In spite of the best efforts of the State it is unable to get around the rigid 
requirement of Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. For example, while citing the 
rule relating to admission of conduct evidence, the State never explains when it attempted 
to obtain "the discretion of the court" in allowing such testimony to proceed. 
State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37 (Utah 1996) is directly on point to the claims now 
being asserted by Defendant. This Court stated in Hovater: 
Officer Faux, during direct examination, was asked about specific instances 
where Thornton helped secure convictions of other suspected drug dealers. He was 
asked how many other persons were arrested, charged, and actually convicted with 
Thornton's help. In addition, Officer Faux was asked if any of these persons ever 
claimed that Thornton "attempted to plant drugs on them." This was extrinsic 
evidence offered to support the credibility of another witness in clear violation of 
Rule 608(b). As such, the testimony was improper. And since the evidence had 
no conceivable beneficial value to Hovater, the failure to object to it cannot be 
excused as trial strategy. Hovater9s counsel was deficient in failing to object to 
evidence so clearly in violation of Rule 608(b), Therefore, Hovater has satisfied 
the first prong of the Strickland test. Id at4L 
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See also State v. Perez, 946 P.2d 724 (Utah App. 1997) (improper questions of two state 
witnesses and arguments to jury by prosecutor concerning informant's prior actions in 
obtaining other convictions was plain error resulting in reversal of defendant's second 
degree felony conviction). 
The fact that Hovater was decided eight days prior to the questioning by the 
prosecutor and his closing statement to the jury does not assist the State. None of the 
cases relied upon by the State involve rules of law established a week prior to the claimed 
event. (State Brief at 65-66). It is pure speculation that "no lawyer except those 
representing the parties in Hovater would have received a copy of the opinion" in light of 
today's electronic court delivery system. In addition, defense counsel were members of 
the Salt Lake Legal Defenders and are presumably aware of all important criminal 
decisions occurring each day. The prosecutor, as a member of the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's office, is also chargeable with knowledge of important trial court decisions as 
they occur. 
Clearly, the failure to object to this evidence and the prosecutor's closing 
argument on the proper ground satisfies the first prong of the Strickland standard. 
Because of the importance of Schroyer in her testimony giving a motive for the killing, 
an eye-witness account of Defendant's alleged running, and several instances of alleged 
confession, her credibility in solving some unrelated crime could have played a 
significant role in the jury's determination as to which criminal witness to believe. 
E. The Inclusion of a Portion of the Testimony of Tina Schroyer 
Was Prejudicial Error. 
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The State attempts to distort the purpose of Tina Schroyer's testimony by claiming 
that it was offered for identification purposes only. The State claims that under 
801(d)(l)(C ) the statements made "were not hearsay". (State Brief at 67). Under Rule 
801(d) none of the provisions qualify as hearsay. Subdivision 801(d)(1)(B) also provides 
that any statement made under it is not hearsay. The hearsay issue is immaterial for 
purposes of this claim. 
Instead, the focus must be upon the purpose of the testimony which was offered by 
the prosecution after a vigorous examination by defense counsel as to Tina's many 
inconsistencies in reporting that she had allegedly seen Defendant run by her window. 
(Tr. 1418-24). No question was ever raised during this examination as to whether 
Defendant or someone else was the one she saw running. 
The sole purpose of the prosecutor's questions quoted in Appellant's Opening 
Brief was to establish credibility in Schroyer by showing the jury that she had 
consistently made the same statements a number of times. The fact that Ms. Schroyer 
maintained a consistent version of the story after 1991 was irrelevant since her motive to 
fabricate occurred in her effort to obtain Robinson's release from jail. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the Tome decision, 115 S.Ct. 696 
(1995) held that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) allows testimony of a prior consistent statement 
introduced to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive if the 
statement has been made before the alleged fabrication, influence or motive but is 
inadmissible if made afterwards. In the Tome case, for example, the government called 
six witnesses to verify statements made by a child witness concerning her alleged abuse 
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even though all of the time periods occurred after her motive to fabricate. Such testimony 
was deemed improperly admitted and highly prejudicial to defendant's claim that the 
child had falsely accused him of abuse in order to stay with her mother. This same type of 
error occurred here. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents the opportunity to develop a standard for appellate review of 
grand jury proceedings involving claims of prosecutorial misconduct. The application of 
the standard proposed by Defendant provides a fair review for both the accused and the 
government. In this case, its application will require the dismissal of the indictment 
because of extreme prosecutorial misconduct. To do nothing in light of this flagrant 
conduct would be to ignore the need for governmental deterrence. 
The trial errors also must be separately evaluated. The unique nature of this ten-
year delayed murder trial, the highly questionable credibility of the State's witnesses, 
plus the exclusion of relevant evidence and inclusion of prejudicial evidence mandates 
that Defendant's conviction be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of March, 1999. 
Craig S. Cbbk 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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